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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE DEFENSE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN
CRIMINAL LIBEL ACTIONS
Both libel and slander are methods of defamation. Libel is expressed
by writing, print, pictures, or signs; and slander takes the form of
oral expressions. The common law conception of libel as a crime has
been recognized in this country and indictments at common law for
such a crime have been sustained. In many states, the common law
rule has been supplemented by express statutes making the offense a
crime. The basis for the distinction between civil and criminal libel
appears to be due to the consequence rather than the character of the
act. "The crime of libelling a private person consists in the malicious
publication of any writing, sign, picture, effigy, or other representa-
tion, tending to expose any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
The gist of the offense is its tendency to provoke a breach of the
peace." Some injury must be shown by the plaintiff in a civil action
and, ordinarily, a plaintiff is content with compensation for it. But the
State is interested because of the further possibility of injury to society
in the sense that the act might incite a breach of the peace. However,
it is not necessary that a civil action lie before a criminal prosecution
can be commenced; and the converse is also true.
Criminal slander prosecutions were a rarity at commbn law. "It
appears to be agreed generally that at common law there has been no
conviction of one for oral defamation of a private person. In England
there are precedents of prosecution for oral defamation of the sedi-
tious type and one rather obscure case of oral defamation of a grand
jury. In general, however, both in England and this country, criminal
slander, where it exists, is statutory in its origin. The statutes vary
from the Arkansas and Wisconsin types, which appear to make crimi-
nal slander as inclusive as criminal libel, to a fairly common type which
prohibits the oral defamation of woman with respect to her chastity.
In these States problems have arisen with reference to malice, truth,
privilege, and publication, and the treatment of them appears to be
similar to that ... in criminal libel."'2
There are four general classes of criminal libels: libels against pri-
vate persons, blasphemous libels, obscene libels, and seditious libels.
Blasphemous libels concern themselves with malicious publications
reviling Christianity. The publication of obscene literature is consid-
ered obscene libel. And, any publication which tends to bring the gov-
ernment into contempt or which tends to ridicule any foreign repre-
'MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW (1934) 492; CLARK, CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed. 1915)
462.
MAY, CaIMINA. LAW (4th ed. 1938) 158.
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sentatives is termed a seditious libel.3 Under the common law there
was not very much an accused could offer in the way of a defense
to a prosecution for any of them. In those earlier days, a libel was
punishable even though the utterance was truthful. But, present day
constitutions and statutes have evolved the following defenses: truth,
justification, and privileged communication.
Although there is a greater abundance of judicial determinations
concerning the matters of "freedom of speech" and "freedom of the
press," there are also many interesting and enlightening cases involv-
ing the question of privileged communications.
Under certain circumstances one may be privileged to write that
which under different circumstances would result in a prosecution for
defamation. The inquiry as to whether a communication is privileged
involves questions of fact as well as law. Where the facts are not dis-
puted, the question of privilege becomes one of law.4 Though all of the
courts do not expressly say so, it is fairly obvious that there are two
kinds of privilege: conditional or qualified, and absolute. The doctrine
of absolute privilege seems to be restricted to those cases involving
pleadings or proceedings in court5 and expressions or arguments in
legislative assemblies.6 A matter which appears to be absolutely privi-
leged may become qualifiedly privileged because of the peculiar fact
situation. Where the communication complained of is made in good
faith on any subject matter in which the party has an interest or in
reference to which he has a duty, either legal, moral, or social, and
is made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, the com-
munication is said to be qualified.7 However, the courts are not in agree-
ment as to whether the utterance must be truthful in fact before a
qualified privilege can be asserted successfully.
A great percentage of the prosecutions for criminal libel is pro-
duced by publications of the press. It seems to be the universal rule
that publications verbatim of the contents of public records are abso-
lutely privileged." In the case of People v. Gordan,9 an owner and pub-
lisher of a magazine was prosecuted for publishing an article which
purported to be a comparison of the oath taken by the Knights of
Columbus and that taken by members of the Ku Klux Klan. Evidence
32 WAFHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932) 2258; 17-R. C. L. 460; 37 C. J.
138.
4 State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508 (1938).
5 Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 123 So. 916 (1929).6 Baker v. State, 199 Ark. 1005, 137 S.V. (2d) 938 (1940).
7 State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508 (1938) ; State v. Cooper, 138 Iowa
516, 116 N.W. 691 (1908), where the court said the person "must have some-
thing more resting upon his conscience than the mere desire to promote the
public welfare to justify him in publishing defamatory matter on the ground
that he believes it to be true."
8 State v. Darwin, 63 Wash. 303, 115 Pac. 309, 33 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1026 (1911).
9 63 Cal. App. 627, 219 Pac. 486 (1923).
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showed that the publisher knew the article was untrue and that he
published it without justifiable ends. The case arose in California and
there was a statute which provided in substance that no reporter, edi-
tor, or proprietor of any newspaper is liable to prosecution for a
fair and true report of any judicial, legislative, or other public official
proceedings except upon proof of malice in making such report, and
that malice is not to be implied from the mere fact of publication.
This statute is similar to many in existence throughout the country.
In interpreting the section, the court said that it did not "afford im-
munity to one who has wilfully and maliciously distorted a statement
found in a legislative publication by intentionally publishing fragmen-
tary and incomplete parts thereof which do not indicate a fair sum-
mary of the whole proceedings."
A newspaper is absolutely privileged in publishing the proceedings
or minutes of conventions and public meetings. But, when a reporter
expresses his opinion as to what such body or convention did, the news-
paper cannot claim absolute privilege.:' Publication of judicial pro-
ceedings is privileged, but comments on the motives of parties thereto,
as to whether they were instituted and conducted in good faith is not
privileged. In a prosecution in the State of Iowa for libel, for charging
that the prosecutor, a lawyer, was guilty of improper conduct and
dishonest motives in instituting disbarment proceedings against other
attorneys, employed by a temperance organization, and had falsified
the records in such proceedings, and had been guilty of other grossly
unprofessional conduct, the publication of such charges was not privi-
leged so as to relieve a defendant from liability therefor if they were
false." So also, a publication to the effect that a judge was prejudiced,
that he had already made up his mind as to the guilt of a defendant,
and that the State was to have another legal lynching, was held not
to be privileged as publication of a judicial proceeding.'" Neither is the
privilege absolute where one, while a grand jury is in session, publishes
a libelous article against an officer whose acts are to be investigated,
and addresses it to the grand jury."3 The press is not absolutely privi-
leged to present views as to the conduct of an attorney at trials. Courts
express indignation at any unwarranted attack upon the law profes-
sion through a discussion of an attorney's conduct in court.' 4
10 State v. Sheridan, 14 Idaho 222, 93 Pac. 656, 15 L.R.A. (N.s.) 497 (1908).
11 State v. Cooper, 138 Iowa 516, 116 N.W. 691 (1908).
12 Cole v. Commonwealth, Warley v. Same, Louisville News v. Same, 222 Ky.
350, 300 S.W. 907 (1927).
"3Commonwealth v. Duncan, 127 Ky. 47, 31 Ky. Law. Rep. 1277, 104 S.W. 997(1907).
14 State v. Wait, 44 Kans. 310, 24 Pac. 354 (1890).
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In People v. Fuller,5 the Illinois court gave a very concise state-
ment as to the limits of the press in commenting upon public officials:
"Public conduct of all public officers is a matter of public concern and
may be made the subject of fair and reasonable criticism, but the privi-
lege does not extend to false and defamatory statements imputing
criminal offense or moral delinquency to the officer in the discharge of
his official duties." When the newspaper contains a truthful statement
of the acts and conduct of a prosecuting attorney, it may comment
upon, criticize, even severely, the same; but to publish, comment upon,
and criticize falsely such officer is entirely a different matter. The
former published from good motives and for justifiable ends is privi-
leged; but the latter never.' 6 Also, the law of privileged communica-
tions or communications conditionally privileged does not apply in the
case of a newspaper publication charging officers of the state institu-
tions with gross dereliction of dutyY
Recognizing that it is to the public interest that the conduct and
qualifications of officials and candidates for public office should be sub-
jected to free and fair criticism and discussion on the part of their
constituents, courts have generally agreed that such criticism presents
a case of qualified privilege. The reason usually given is that when
one becomes a candidate for public office, he must be considered as
putting his character in issue so far as it may affect his fitness and
qualifications for office, and the publication of the truth in regard to
his qualifications for the purpose of advising electors is not libel.' 8
"This privilege, however, may be lost if the communication exceeds
what the occasion requires and is fostered by malice."' 9
Libelous or slanderous statements outside of judicial proceedings
have not given rise to many criminal prosecutions. In an early decision
in Texas it was pointed out that statements which would otherwise be
slanderous are privileged when made to the father of a person alleged
to have been slandered, after having been pressed by him to speak.20
But later, this same court held that a volunteered statement made under
similar circumstances was not privileged.21 Several cases decided in
15 238 Ill. 116, 87 N.E. 336 (1909); Oakes v. State, 98 Miss. 80, 54 So. 79, 33
L.R.A. (N.s.) 207 (1910).
16 Nicholson v. State, 24 Wyo. 347, 157 Pac. 1013 (1916); State v. Sefrit, 82
Wash. 520, 114 Pac. 725 (1914) ; Benton et aL v. State, 59 N.J.L. 551, 36 At.
1041 (1897).
'7 Banner Publishing Co. v. State, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 176, 57 Am. Rep. 214 (1885).
18 State v. Greenville Pub. Co. et al., 179 N.C. 720, 102 S.E. 318 (1920);
Commonwealth v. Pratt, Same v. Pratt et al., Same v. Somerville Evening
Sun, 208 Mass. 553, 95 N.E. 105 (1911).
'9 State ex rel. Arnold v. Chase, 94 Fla. 1071, 114 So. 856 (1927); But see:
People v. Turner, 28 Cal. App. 766, 154 Pac. 34 (1915).
20 Davis v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 265, 22 S.W. 979 (1893).
2 1 Richmond v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 435, 126 S.W. 596, 137 Am. St. Rep. 973
(1910).
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that state have held a privilege in one situation and none in another.
At first glance, there seems to be inconsistency in the court's determina-
tions but an examination of the facts reveals the reasons for the
different conclusions. A statement made to a husband about his wife
upon his request was held privileged.22 But, a statement made by a
husband to a friend about the husband's wife was held not privileged.22
Likewise, the fact that the person to whom the slanderous statement
was made was a friend of a defendant did not make it privileged.2
4
Another case decided the matter was not privileged because a defendant
was the originator of the false charge and had not stated that he merely
heard such a story. 25 It should be noted that all of the cases dealt with
the alleged oral defamation of the character of a woman 2 6
Although the foregoing cases are few in number, they illustrate the
doctrine of "interested party" which courts enunciate more expressly
in cases involving written material. In State v. Fish,27 the court states:
"A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he
has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it may contain criminatory matter which,
without this privilege, would be slanderous or libelous and actionable."
Circulating an article among the voters of a particular county for the
purpose of giving what a defendant believes to be truthful information
and only for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their ballots
more intelligently raises a privilege.2 8 The voters are interested in ob-
taining a proper administration. But, a defendant cannot claim that the
matter is absolutely privileged in such a case. "Whether the writing
comes within the qualified privilege as to defamatory statements con-
cerning a public officer is for the jury to determine." 2 The question of
whether an "open letter" to a newspaper comes within the rule of
privileged communication in criminal cases has been answered nega-
tively in the recent case of Baker v. State.3 ° There, a founder of a
hospital wrote a personal letter to a newspaper charging that the opera-
22 McDonald v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 125, 164 S.W. 831 (1914).
23 Stayton v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 305, 78 S.W. 1071, 108 Am. St. Rep. 988 (1904).
24 Jones v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 425, 232 S.W. 304 (1921).
25 Davis v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. R. 298, 167 S.W. 1108, L.R.A. 1915A 572 (1914).
26 There appears to be a scarcity of judicial determinations of this type. How-
ever, in addition to the Texas cases cited, the following decisions are available:
State v. Hughey, 120 S.C. 156, 112 S.E. 823 (1922) ; State v. Gurry, 163 S.C. 1,
161 S.E. 191 (1931).
2791 N.J.L. 228, 102 Atl. 378, L.R.A. 1918E 12 (1917).
28 State v. Balch, 31 Kan. 465, 2 Pac. 609 (1884) ; Commonwealth v. Foley, 292
Pa. 277, 141 Atl. 50 (1928), where a conviction on a count of libel when the
district attorney was a candidate and a second count charging distribution
of a defamatory circular without his signature was affirmed.28 State v. Wilson, 137 Wash. 125, 241 Pac. 970, 43 A.L.R. 1263 (1925).
30 199 Ark. 1005, 137 S.W. (2d) 938 (1940).
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tors of a tourist camp were using underhanded methods in attempting
to discredit the hospital doctors and deprive the hospital of patients.
There was a conviction of libel and the hospital founder contended
that the open letter was privileged. The court stated: "This was not a
privileged communication which would be a defense against a prosecu-
tion for criminal libel, where there was no showing that the hospital
was an organized charity, conducted in the public interest, and writer
of letter personally assumed responsibility for the letter, absolved the
hospital from any blame, and boasted that he had affidavits to prove
all assertions." Another viewpoint is expressed in a Louisiana deci-
sion " concerning a letter addressed by a father to a custodian of his
minor children which demanded a return of the children. The court
held the communication qualifiedly privileged in the absence of a show-
ing of express malice. Discussing the matter of "interested party," the
court said: "The qualified privilege exists where the communication
complained of is made in good faith on any subject matter in which
the party has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty, either
legal, moral, or social, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty."
Undoubtedly, the best examples of privileged communications are
furnished by expressions or arguments in legislatures and court rooms.
"The underlying principle governing the courts of England and our
own country is that the proper administration of justice depends upon
freedom of conduct on the part of counsel and parties to litigation. '32
The existence of a privilege is a question of law, and if it be deter-
mined that language used was not impertinent or irrelevant, the privi-
lege is absolute. The following excerpt from the case of Ange v. State33
summarizes the general rule: "The doctrine is well settled that defam-
atory words when used by parties, counsel, or witnesses in the due
course of judicial procedure, and when relevant to the matter in hand,
and pertinent to the subject of inquiry, are privileged and cannot be
made the basis of a proceeding for libel or defamation, no matter how
false or malicious such statements may in fact be. This rule of privi-
lege as applied to statements made in the course of judicial proceed-
ings is not restricted to trials of actions, but includes proceedings be-
fore a competent court or magistrate in the due course of law or the
administration of justice which is to result in any determination or
action by such court or officer. This privilege extends to the prosecu-
31 State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508 (1938). But see: Browning v. Com-
monwealth, 116 Ky. 282, 25 Ky. Law. Rep. 482, 76 S.W. 19 (1903), where a
similar letter was held not privileged.
32 People ex rel. Bensky v. Warden of City Prison et al., 258 N.Y. 55, 179 N.E.
257 (1932).
33 98 Fla. 538, 123 So. 916 (1929).
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tion of the judge, parties, counsel, and witnesses, and arises immedi-
ately upon the doing of any act required or permitted by law in the due
course of the judicial proceedings or as necessarily preliminary thereto.
• . . Defamatory words published in the due course of judicial pro-
cedure, which are not relevant or pertinent to the subject of inquiry,
are only conditionally or qualifiedly privileged; that is, prima facie
privileged. If such publications be irrelevant, they do not necessarily
become actionable unless they were also malicious."
Although statements in pleadings in a judicial proceeding are gen-
erally treated as privileged, this principle does not apply to persons
not a party to the action. In a recent Arizona decision 4 involving a
contested election, a defendant contended that an affidavit filed in the
case was merely a part of an amended complaint. The court, disregard-
ing the contention, said that "when he made the affidavit and unleashed
it into the hands of others to be read and otherwise used" there was
no possible reason for filing it in the contest case, except to give its
contents general publicity before the general election. The case serves
to illustrate that the matter must be within the confines of a judicial
proceeding. A Kentucky case3 5 pointed out that a judicial proceeding
includes an impeachment proceeding. On the other hand, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court has held that the provision respecting the absolute
privilege of members of the Legislature does not apply to proceedings
before the common council of cities.38 Neither does the privilege arise
where there has been an unprivileged publication by a defendant of the
same or similar libel or slander prior to his statement in court.Y In a
Georgia decision, 38 it was held that the accused, in making his unsworn
statement before a municipal court, is not privileged to use opprobrious
words or abusive language in the presence of another tending to cause
a breach of the peace unless the matter relates and has some relevancy
to the charge, or that he honestly believes it has.
Likewise, communications made to a prosecuting officer are gen-
erally privileged when made in good faith in the prosecution of an
inquiry regarding a crime which has been committed. But, in a Kansas
case,3 9 the court called attention to the fact that "public policy is not
served by withholding communications which have not been made in
good faith to the prosecuting officer, but which, on the contrary, are
clearly shown to have been made as part of a vile conspiracy to blacken
and defame one who is known by the authors of the communications
3 Ross v. State, 54 Ariz. 396, 96 P. (2d) 285 (1939).
35 Yancey v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 207, 122 S.W. 123, 25 L.R.A. (N.s.) 455
(1909).
3 Branigan v. State, 208 Wis. 543, 243 N.W. 478 (1932).
37Robinson v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 556, 179 S.W. 1157 (1915).
38 Lecroy v. State, 89 Ga. 335, 15 S.E. 463 (1892).
39 State v. Wilcox, 90 Kan. 80, 132 Pac. 982 (1913).
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to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing." The court continued: "Where
the reason for the rule no longer exists, the rule fails." Consequently,
the court, in Boeckle v. State,40 said that statements of an accused to a
constable accompanied by a statement that the accused did not wish
to file a complaint did not constitute a privileged communication.
Prosecutions for criminal slander or libel because of statements
made orally or written by public officials appear to be scarce. In the
case of People v. Faber,41 a member of the board of trustees of the
City of Coronado, California, called upon the mayor (who was also a
member of the board) and asked for an appointment of himself as a
committee to investigate the propriety of retaining a chief of police. At
that time a statement was made, in the presence of the mayor and his
wife, concerning the chief of police. A statute provided for absolute
privilege in the case of words spoken by an official in the discharge of
his duties or in official proceedings. The official was convicted of
slander but the case was sent back for retrial because of improper
instructions. The court said that, since there was no official body or
tribunal in session, the communication could be privileged only if
uttered in the proper discharge of an official duty, and that the exist-
ence of those conditions was a question for the jury. Further, the
court directed that there be an instruction to the effect that the casual
presence of an uninterested third party did not necessarily remove the
privilege. This ruling indicates that the California court does not apply
the doctrine of "interested party" to utterances of an official acting in
his official capacity.
Decisions which involve statements or written material presented to
fraternal orders,4 2 at school meetings,43 and in church records 44 have
been placed in the category of qualified communications. However,
courts call attention to the fact that such communications quickly lose
their privilege when they are actuated by malice and not made in good
faith.45
The dispensing of credit information has not resulted in any great
amount of criminal prosecutions for libel. In an early Wisconsin case"
it was stated that a communication to a commercial agency from its
local correspondent, as to the commercial standing of a person doing
business in any place, "is so far privileged in the hands of the persons
40 102 Tex. Cr. R. 641, 279 S.W. 472 (1926).
4129 Cal. App. 751, 77 P. (2d) 921 (1928).
42 Graham v. State, 7 Ga. App. 407, 66 S.E. 1038 (1910); State v. Drake, 122
S.C. 350, 115 S.E. 297 (1922).
43 Vallery v. State, 42 Neb. 123, 60 N.W. 347 (1894).
4 Grant v. State, 141 Ala. 96, 37 So. 420 (1904) ; Kubricht v. State, 44 Tex. Cr.
R. 94, 69 S.W. 157, 100 Am. St. Rep. 842, 58 A.L.R. 959 (1902).
45Supra, notes 42, 43, and 44.4 6 The State ex rel. Lanning and another v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, 4 N.W. 390
(1880).
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conducting such agency, that they may lawfully make known its con-
tents confidentially to their subscribers seeking information upon that
subject; provided this is done without malice and in the belief that the
statements are true." However, in a New Jersey decision 47 involving
a civil action, the court said that the publication of an erroneous state-
ment of a plaintiff's financial standing was unprivileged because it was
communicated to clients of a defendant having no interest therein.
In conclusion, the determination of the existence of a privileged
communication, therefore, is dependent entirely upon the conditions
under which the communication was made. The questions invol,.ed
are those of fact as well as of law. Where the facts are not disputed
the question of privilege becomes one of law. If the matter is in the
class of absolute privilege, there appears to be little possibility of crimi-
nal prosecution. However, in cases involving qualified privilege, there
is greater likelihood of prosecution. Generally, when a communication
is absolutely privileged, it cannot be made the basis of a proceeding for
libel or slander no matter how false it may be. But, if the communica-
tion exceeds the demands of the occasion, it may become qualifiedly
privileged and the defense may be lost upon an assertion of malice.
It is essential to a qualified privilege that the statement made or pub-
lished be made in good faith. Consequently, each set of facts must be
analyzed to discover whether the matter unnecessarily exceeds the
bounds of the occasion.
LEROY J. GONRING.
47 King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L. 417, 9 AtI. 705, 60 Am. Rep. 622 (1887).
